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 taking up daniels’ challenge: the case 
for global health justice
Gorik Ooms and Rachel Hammonds
abstract
In Just Health, Norman Daniels makes a strong argument for obligations of  mutu-
al assistance to fulfill the right to health at the national level and challenges readers 
to develop arguments supporting obligations of  mutual assistance at the global level. 
In this paper, we argue that there is global responsibility for global health and that 
there are obligations of  justice (beyond charity) to help fulfill (not merely respect or 
even protect) the right to health in other countries; these we call obligations of  global 
health justice. We show how international human rights law affirms obligations of  
global health justice — beyond national obligations and beyond obligations of  char-
ity — and assert that the human rights approach provides guidance on delineating the 
relationship between national and global responsibility for fulfilling the core obligations 
that arise from socioeconomic human rights and addressing global health inequities. 
We further argue that new ways of  providing international assistance, originating from 
the global HIV/AIDS response, demonstrate the feasibility of  improving health 
outcomes through exogenous efforts and that obligations of  global health justice thus 
carry much weight: the weight of  lives not saved. The global response to the HIV/
AIDS pandemic has led to the emergence of  a new international health assistance 
paradigm, and the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is, we 
suggest, an embryonic form of  this new paradigm. We conclude that agreements on 
several common parameters delineating global and national responsibility for global 
health can advance the movement towards a global institution for the distribution of  
health-related goods.
introduction
In his book, Just Health, Norman Daniels develops a complex theory 
of  health justice with a call for action.1 While making a strong case for 
national health justice (a case for obligations of  mutual assistance to 
reduce health inequalities at the national level), Daniels wonders whether 
he can stretch his theory to also make the case for obligations of  mutual 
assistance beyond state borders. Daniels acknowledges that arguments 
of  relational justice, on which his theory of  health justice is based, can-
not easily be expanded to the global level. Yet he notes in his “conclud-
ing challenge” that, “[d]espite the lack of  closure on these matters, the 
account developed here provides an integrated theory that helps us see 
the path to pursue in promoting population health and distributing it 
fairly, globally as well as domestically.”2
In this paper, we take up Daniels’ challenge for action. Building on sev-
eral of  his arguments, we apply his framework to further develop a thesis 
we have published elsewhere concerning global responsibility for health.3 
We understand such global responsibility as supplementing, not replac-
ing, national responsibility for health. 
Daniels’ presentation of  the differences between global and national 
responsibilities in health justice suggests an innate tension, with the path 
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to a successful integration being one that requires 
careful, constant negotiation between dangerous 
but opposing alternatives. Throughout this paper 
we envision the space between these alternatives — 
the space in which to formulate and establish global 
health justice — as comparable to the narrow strait 
between Scylla and Charybdis, the two great sea 
monsters that Odysseus, in Greek mythology, had 
to keep equally distant to ensure the safety of  his 
journey through the strait; even when equidistant, 
the nearness of  each threatened to destroy his ship 
and its sailors.4 Although Daniels does not use the 
Scylla-Charybdis metaphor directly, his “conclud-
ing challenge” is explicitly shaped by an argument 
that directs the reader to an “intermediary ground” 
that “resists the pull” of  two opposing alternatives. 
Specifically, he writes:
[I]nquiry should focus on a middle 
ground between strongly statist claims 
that egalitarian requirements of  social 
justice are solely the domain of  the 
nation-state and its well-defined basic 
structure [as drawn from John Rawls 
and Thomas Nagel] and strong cosmo-
politan claims that principles of  justice 
apply to individuals globally, regardless 
of  the relations in which they stand or 
the institutional structures through with 
they interact.5 
We agree with Daniels on the risks of  both of  these 
claims. We agree with his call to resist “the pull of  
cosmopolitan intuition” since, as he argues, too much 
focus on global responsibility, without a strong affir-
mation of  the primacy of  national responsibility, 
could erode the latter.6 We also agree that the global 
institution necessary to govern the relationship 
between national and global responsibility is lacking, 
and we argue that this deficiency should provide suf-
ficient impetus to create such an institution. We also 
agree that it is, at the same time, essential to resist 
what Daniels calls “strongly statist versions of  rela-
tional justice.”7 Indeed, if  states were the only insti-
tutions that could govern health justice, the absence 
of  a “global state” would exonerate states from all 
responsibility for the consequences of  their behavior 
beyond their immediate national borders.
We disagree with Daniels, however, in his rejection 
of  international human rights law as a potential com-
pass that could guide the journey through this narrow 
strait of  delineating the relationship between national 
and global responsibility for health. In this paper, we 
demonstrate how a human rights approach provides 
guidance for such a journey. We also argue that it is 
not difficult to perceive what a global institution that 
could govern this relationship might look like; in fact, 
we believe a prototype already exists in the form of  
the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (the Global Fund). The Global Fund struc-
ture is presently defined more by its practical action 
than by any pre-determined theoretical foundation of  
global health justice. Envisioning the Global Fund as 
a model useful for giving shape to Daniels’ challenge 
can also, in turn, provide a theoretical foundation to 
strengthen the work of  the Global Fund itself. 
global responsibility for growing 
health inequalities
Daniels defines health inequity (or injustice) as the 
“unjust distribution of  the socially controllable fac-
tors affecting population health and its distribution.”8 
Following John Arras and Elizabeth Fenton, we will 
here discuss “health-related goods” as shorthand for 
Daniels’ “socially controllable factors affecting popu-
lation health and its distribution.”9
Health-related goods cost money. No matter which 
priorities ranking one uses, health care, preven-
tion, water, sanitation, and nutrition all cost money. 
Therefore, wealth inequalities between nations have 
a direct impact on their respective health inequali-
ties. What governments can spend on the distribu-
tion of  health-related goods depends on their rev-
enue, which is affected by their wealth. The increase 
in wealth inequality between nations, with its direct 
effect on health inequity is, we argue, a matter of  
global responsibility. 
In his studies on the evolution of  global wealth 
inequalities, Branko Milanovic demonstrated that 
wealth inequalities between countries, expressed as an 
inter-country Gini coefficient, are steadily growing.10 
A Gini coefficient of  zero for inter-country wealth 
distribution would mean that all countries have exact-
ly the same average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita, that is, full inter-country equality. A Gini 
coefficient of  one for inter-country wealth distri-
bution would mean that one single country would 
enjoy the entire GDP of  the world’s economy (or 
maximum inequality). Figure 1 illustrates how wealth 
inequality between countries is in fact progressively 
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moving toward maximum inequality and away from 
maximum equality. 
There are many reasons for this increasing inter-
country inequality. One that we should not under-
estimate is the long-lasting effects of  slavery and 
colonization.11 Rich countries use their economic 
and political power to negotiate uneven trade agree-
ments.12 The shift of  financial resources from poor 
to rich countries that can be attributed to identifiable 
illegal or at least illicit causes, that is, “illicit financial 
flows,” also contribute to and can obscure interna-
tional assistance from rich to poor countries.13 
Another cause that can also explain this principle, 
but may be easily overlooked, is what Robert Merton 
called the “Matthew Effect.”14 Referring to a verse in 
the biblical Gospel of  Matthew — “For to all those 
who have, more will be given, and they will have 
an abundance; but from those who have nothing, 
even what they have will be taken away” — Merton 
explains how scientists who already have a well-estab-
lished reputation in their field are more likely to be 
recognized and awarded for their work than lesser-
known scientists, even when both contribute evenly 
to a scientific advancement.15
Gunnar Myrdal drew on this same biblical quotation 
to explain his theory of  “circular and cumulative cau-
sation,” which predicts growing inequalities within 
and between countries participating in a free market.16 
Myrdal’s theory argues “that the play of  the forces 
of  the market normally tends to increase, rather than 
decrease, the inequalities between regions.”17 Centers 
of  strong economic growth attract capital and skills, 
and can invest in an efficient logistical infrastructure, 
thus growing even faster. In their direct periphery, 
they may cause “spread effects,” that is, benefits 
for regions that are within the direct periphery of  
economic growth centers. Further from the center, 
however, the existence of  these “economic growth 
centers” cause “backwash effects,” as distant regions 
suffer from the flight of  their capital and skills toward 
economic growth centers. Within wealthy countries, 
spread effects can be stronger than backwash effects, 
and “state policies have been initiated which are 
directed toward greater regional equality: the market 
forces which result in backwash effects have been off-
set, while those resulting in spread effects have been 
supported.”18 Poor countries, on the other hand, tend 
to predominantly suffer the backwash effects from 
economic growth centers, since such growth centers 
are usually located in other countries. In Myrdal’s 
words: 
If  from one point of  view the explana-
tion of  the existing and ever-increasing 
international inequalities is the cumula-
tive tendency inherent in the unham-
pered play of  the market forces in a 
situation where the effectiveness of  the 
spread effects is weak, from another 
point of  view the explanation is the 
absence of  a world state which could 
interfere in the interest of  equality of  
opportunity.19
The impact of  obvious global wrongdoings — like 
colonization and slavery, unfair trade rules, and illicit 
financial flows — should not be underestimated. In 
his overview of  the many ways in which rich coun-
tries are contributing to both the continued poverty 
of  poor countries and poverty within poor countries, 
Thomas Pogge argued that obligations of  global jus-
tice are first and foremost obligations of  correction 
to compensate for failure to fulfill the negative duty 
of  doing no harm.20 We also would affirm the critical 
importance of  correcting the obvious harm that is 
being done by rich countries to the rest of  the world. 
But even if  it were possible to correct or compensate 
for all past and present obvious wrongdoings, even 
if  a level playing field could be established for global 
free trade, global free trade would still produce some 
winners and some losers. And if  winners are allowed 
to invest their present gains in future comparative 
advantages without global corrective measures, the 
Gini coefficient for inter-country wealth inequality 
Figure 1. Inter-country Gini coefficients, 1980–2000
Adapted from B. Milanovic, Worlds apart: 
Measuring international and global inequality 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 39 
and 181.
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will continue to grow toward one and away from zero. 
This global-level Matthew Effect is a less obvious 
form of  harm and might therefore not call for cor-
rection on the basis of  the negative duty of  doing no 
harm. It does call for correction, however, because it 
reduces some countries’ capacity to distribute health-
related goods; as Daniels argues, for obligations of  
mutual assistance at the national level, “health is of  
special moral importance because protecting normal 
functioning helps to protect the range of  opportuni-
ties open to people and because various theories of  
justice support the idea that we have an obligation 
to protect opportunity and thus health.”21 To protect 
equal opportunity globally, taking the Matthew Effect 
into account at the global level, obligations of  mutual 
assistance beyond borders are needed.
If  health injustice is, as Daniels defines it, the “unjust 
distribution of  the socially controllable factors affect-
ing population health and its distribution,” then one 
should seriously consider whether or not the global 
free market — and the growing inter-country wealth 
inequalities it is producing — is a source of  growing 
health inequalities, insofar as it undermines the ability 
of  poor countries to purchase health-related goods for 
its inhabitants.22 On this point, one could argue that if  
the Matthew Effect is inherent to the global free mar-
ket, the only alternative would be to move away from 
this system and aim instead for a global multi-state-
controlled market. If  such a move took place, one 
could argue, the cure might be worse than the disease. 
We suggest that there is another alternative. 
According to Robert Archer, the dynamic of  self-
amplifying wealth and poverty was recognized and 
understood by industrialized countries more than 
a century ago, when “many governments in richer 
countries came to realise, or were pressured to 
accept, that extreme social and economic inequities 
were unsustainable.”23 To overcome these inequali-
ties, Archer asserts that “systems of  universal health 
care, social security, unemployment insurance and 
public housing were put in place.”24 These systems, 
known as social protection schemes, have been 
invented and reinvented repeatedly, and they take 
many different shapes and forms. But in essence, 
they all effect similar actions: financial resources are 
collected in accordance with participants’ means and 
redistributed directly or in the form of  health-related 
goods, education-related goods, or other social rights 
related goods, in accordance with participants’ needs. 
The primary distribution of  wealth, resulting from 
free markets, did not guarantee the just distribu-
tion of  these goods. A secondary system for wealth 
redistribution was needed, through redistribution 
that involved either money transfers or social rights-
related goods transfers (such as, for example, the 
government purchasing health care services for indi-
viduals who need it).25 As we argue further below, a 
similar system of  secondary redistribution of  wealth 
at the global level could successfully counter the 
Matthew Effect and allow a less unjust distribution 
of  health-related goods to take place. It is precisely 
because a secondary redistribution of  wealth system 
fails to occur at the global level, as Myrdal notes, 
that we argue for the need to recognize and support 
global responsibility for growing health inequalities. 
In short, we do not argue that the global free market 
ought to be abolished but rather that it be adjusted to 
address and correct this distortion. 
global ability to redress growing 
health inequalities
Daniels emphasizes that some developing countries 
perform much better than others when it comes to 
improving the health of  their population, and there-
fore that the “[p]rimary responsibility for realizing 
rights to health and health care in a population should 
rest with each state.”26 We would agree, as long as 
this statement is not misunderstood to suggest that 
the secondary global responsibility is meaningless. 
Indeed, given the rather disappointing track record 
of  global efforts to improve global health, it is 
tempting to conclude that real progress in reducing 
health inequalities can only come from endogenous 
efforts.27 But perhaps the partial failure of  exogenous 
efforts is a result of  lack of  effort due precisely to the 
conviction that endogenous activities are the key to 
real progress in global health. 
 
This misperception is evident in the way that sus-
tainability is commonly viewed. In the field of  inter-
national assistance for health, according to Enrico 
Pavignani and Allessandro Colombo: 
Sustainability is continuously invoked as 
a key criterion to assess any aid-induced 
activity or initiative. Sometimes, the con-
cept is given the weight of  a decisive 
argument. Thus, to declare something 
“unsustainable” may sound as equivalent 
of  “worthless” or even “harmful,” in this 
way overruling any other consideration.28 
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Pablo Gottret and Georges Schieber reiterate this 
common definition of  sustainability in their observa-
tion that “[s]ustainability has generally been described 
in terms of  self-sufficiency.”29 Both of  these observa-
tions suggest that, at present, international assistance 
will not support any distribution of  health-related 
goods that cannot be sustained by the country itself. 
In other words, international assistance will only sup-
port distribution of  health-related goods efforts that 
the beneficiary country could sustain independently 
(and if  it could sustain these efforts independently, 
the international assistance would not be necessary). 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that interna-
tional assistance has not made a big difference.
However, it is not entirely correct that sustainabil-
ity (in the sense of  self-sufficiency) is invoked as a 
criterion for all aid-induced activities. Certainly it is 
not required in humanitarian or medical relief  inter-
ventions. The medical relief  paradigm was originally 
designed to respond to acute health crises, to “help 
populations get back to where they were before 
disaster struck.” 30 Therefore, the criterion of  sustain-
ability is not really considered when determining the 
appropriateness of  the medical relief  response; as the 
crisis is supposed to be temporary, it is assumed that 
long-term response will not be necessary. 
Those who practice the medical relief  paradigm have 
faced their greatest challenges in the case of  chronic 
health crises. These include the epidemics of  HIV/
AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, but also recurring 
episodes of  malnutrition, and even generalized lack 
of  access to the most basic level of  health care. Alan 
Whiteside and Amy Whalley blame humanitarian 
actors for their failure to “provide clear guidelines as 
to when an event is severe enough to be declared an 
emergency” and “recognize change in the nature of  
disasters,” with the result that they do not address the 
real humanitarian crises.31
This has changed in recent years, with humanitarian 
organizations becoming more responsive to chronic 
health crises. Such organizations, however, continue 
to rely on expatriate implementers and parallel man-
agement systems and the need to remain independent 
from governments, distancing strategies designed to 
allow humanitarian organizations to act in acute cri-
ses and interventions in armed conflicts in particular. 
Such strategies seriously limit the potential of  such 
organizations to respond to chronic health crises. 
Indeed, one should not expect that the two classic 
international assistance for health paradigms will 
be adequate to successfully redress global health 
inequalities. One is too focused on domestic self-
reliance; the other has to remain independent from 
the governments of  the countries in which it oper-
ates. The global AIDS response began as a medical 
relief  response out of  necessity, not only because 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic created a crisis situation 
in high prevalence countries, but also because the 
health development paradigm could not accommo-
date the costs of  AIDS treatment.32 Medical relief  
organizations like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
were among the first to provide AIDS treatment in 
low-income countries. The President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief  (PEPFAR) of  the USA con-
tains both “emergency” and “relief ” in its name; 
both words attest to the medical relief  roots of  the 
global AIDS response. 
 
Distinguishing between operational sustainability 
and financial sustainability is essential to understand-
ing how the global AIDS response evolved from its 
medical relief  roots. Figure 2 illustrates its place at 
the intersection of  health development and medical 
relief. Like health development efforts, the global 
AIDS response aims for operational sustainability in 
the conventional sense of  self-sufficiency. And like 
medical relief  efforts, it relies on sustained inter-
national financial support. Michel Kazatchkine, the 
executive director of  the Global Fund, identified the 
development of  this intersection in his closing speech 
at the XVII International AIDS Conference, noting, 
“The Global Fund has helped to change the develop-
ment paradigm by introducing a new concept of  sus-
tainability. One that is not based solely on achieving 
Figure 2. The global AIDS response, at the inter-
section of  health development and medical relief  
paradigms.
The global AIDS response
Health development Medical relief
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domestic self-reliance but on sustained international 
support as well.”33
This new paradigm of  international assistance for 
health — aiming for operational self-sufficiency with-
out aiming for financial self-sufficiency — clearly has 
broad potential application and counters the argu-
ment that only endogenous efforts effectively reduce 
health inequalities. The World Health Organization 
(WHO)’s 2008 report acknowledges that “the steep 
increase in external funds directed towards health 
through bilateral channels or through the new gen-
eration of  global financing instruments has boosted 
the vitality of  the health sector.”34 But the report then 
adds immediately that “[t]hese additional funds need 
to be progressively re-channeled in ways that help 
build institutional capacity towards a longer-term 
goal of  self-sustaining, universal coverage.”35
The new sustainability paradigm within which the 
Global Fund operates was born of  necessity rather 
than theory. And while praising the Global Fund for 
boosting the vitality of  the health sector, WHO now 
argues for a return to the self-sufficiency paradigm.36 
To this we respond by first asserting that the success 
of  the Global Fund gives weight to a theory of  global 
health justice (discussed further below), and second, 
that the formulation of  a relevant theory is necessary 
to provide an important theoretical foundation for 
practice, both the practice of  the Global Fund itself  
and related practices to realize global health justice. 
international human rights law as a 
compass
In the arguments above, we have affirmed Daniels’ 
arguments for the obligations of  global health jus-
tice and have drawn on them to push our assertions 
beyond the immediate limits of  his philosophical 
narrative. On the issue of  using international human 
rights law to establish new global health justice theo-
ry, however, we disagree. 
Daniels questions the usefulness of  international 
human rights law as a compass to navigate between 
the dual risks of  what he calls “cosmopolitan intu-
ition” and “strongly statist versions of  relational 
justice.” He argues that international human rights 
law says very little about global health justice because 
the obligation of  progressive realization of  social 
human rights is closely linked to the availability of  
national resources. His reasoning can be illustrated 
by comparing maternal mortality in Norway with 
that in Burundi.37 For example, if  the risk of  dying 
while giving birth is a hundred times higher for a 
woman living in Burundi than for a woman living in 
Norway, such risk discrepancy does not necessarily 
reflect a violation of  the right to health. Such a vio-
lation would exist if  the maternal mortality level in 
Burundi results from insufficient allocation of  gov-
ernment revenue to maternal health care services, or 
from discrimination against part of  the population. 
But if  Burundi’s higher maternal mortality is merely 
the result of  insufficient government revenue — the 
result of  Burundi being a very poor country — then 
it would not constitute a violation of  the right to 
health. In Daniels’ words: 
Consequently, some inequalities may 
fall within the range of  reasonable 
efforts at progressive realization of  the 
right to health. In addition, because of  
their unequal resources, different states 
may achieve unequal health outcomes 
while still securing the right to health 
and health care for their populations.38
Daniels’ reasoning seems to exclude any consider-
ation of  international assistance. Surely, any evalua-
tion of  progress made in realizing the right to health 
globally must consider scarcity of  available resources. 
But estimates of  available resources should not be 
limited to government revenue; they should also 
include resources from international assistance. 
However, including resources from international 
assistance is problematic in many aspects. Should 
one consider the quantitative value of  present inter-
national assistance? Or should one consider the 
quantitative value of  the international assistance that 
a country ought to receive? And if  the latter is the case, 
then how do we ascertain how much international 
assistance a country like Burundi ought to receive?
To answer these questions, we suggest the concept of  
core content of  social human rights as a useful con-
ceptual tool. In offering this new suggestion, we are 
building further on an element contained in Daniels’ 
system. Replying to Thomas Nagel, Daniels explains 
his own rejection of  the “strongly statist versions of  
relational justice” by explaining that “Nagel rejects the 
idea that we might work out a “sliding scale” of  obli-
gations that falls between state-mediated justice and 
the cosmopolitan view, that is, in the space in which 
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I am proposing we work out our obligations.”39 We 
argue below that indeed the concept of  core content 
of  social human rights offers such a sliding scale, in the 
space between state-mediated justice and the cosmo-
politan view. But before we proceed to this argument, 
it is first necessary to identify the key sources of  inter-
national human rights law that enable us to develop 
such an argument. These include 1) the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights (UDHR); 2) two 
derivative international covenants, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR); 3) the 1989 Convention on 
the Rights of  the Child (CRC); and 4) the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights general com-
ment on the right to health.
While the 1948 UDHR is the foundation of  inter-
national human rights law, it is not a legally binding 
document in itself, but expresses values later embod-
ied in legally binding obligations through internation-
al human rights treaties that are based on it.40 The 
ICCPR and the ICESCR are two examples of  such 
documents derived from the UDHR that contain 
legally binding obligations for the states that ratify 
them.41 Article 12 of  the ICESCR defines the right to 
health as “the right to the highest attainable standard 
of  physical and mental health,” and the related obli-
gations include the provision of  health care services 
and of  preconditions of  health, including access to 
safe water, food security and housing.42 This basic 
definition is affirmed and expanded in later inter-
national conventions, including the CRC and other 
national and international legislation.43 A further 
important development occurred in 2000 when the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(the Committee) issued a general comment on the 
right to health, addressing the scope of  the right to 
health and the importance of  international coopera-
tion in achieving the right to health.44 Whereas the 
language of  article 2(1) of  the ICESCR does not 
allow distinguishing between national and interna-
tional obligations — countries are bound “to take 
steps, individually and through international assis-
tance and co-operation” — the general comment on 
the right to health clarifies the scope of  national and 
international obligations. 
A key element of  social rights is that they are 
expected to be realized in a progressive manner, 
over time, in accordance with available resources.45 
As this relates to the right to health, the Committee 
notes: “The concept of  progressive realization con-
stitutes a recognition of  the fact that full realization 
of  all economic, social and cultural rights will gen-
erally not be able to be achieved in a short period 
of  time.”46 The concept of  progressive realization 
should never be misinterpreted to justify endless 
delays in realizing social rights. It is not to be viewed 
as “an escape hatch (for) recalcitrant states.”47 Such 
an interpretation would deprive social rights of  any 
meaningful value. Thus, the Committee notes that 
States parties have “an obligation to move as expe-
ditiously and effectively as possible.”48 Against any 
idea that “progressive realization” might imply “no 
immediate obligations,” the Committee emphasizes 
a series of  concepts and principles that define the 
nature of  States’ obligations, including the principle 
of  non-retrogression (a state should not take steps 
backwards), the principle of  non-discrimination, 
and the concept of  core content. We will focus here 
on the concept of  core content, as it is the key prin-
ciple of  international human rights law that gives 
rise to obligations of  global health justice, and, as 
such, might be used to clarify obligations of  global 
health justice. 
The Committee defined the core content of  the right 
to health through its definition of  the core obliga-
tions that arise from the right to health. Core obliga-
tions include obligations to ensure access to essential 
health services and promotion of  the preconditions 
of  health. Essential health services include the provi-
sion of  essential drugs, as defined by the WHO. 
For most health practitioners in developing countries, 
this definition sounds like a wild dream. Low-income 
countries are simply too poor to provide a basic 
package of  health services, which is estimated by 
WHO to cost US$40 per person per year.49 Given the 
principle of  ultra posse nemo obligator, that is, the idea 
that no person (or country) can be obligated beyond 
what he, she or it is able to do, does it make sense 
to define core obligations that are unaffordable for 
low-income countries? It does, in light of  article 2, 
para. 1 of  the ICESCR, which states that “Each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and 
co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of  its available resources.”50 When consid-
ering the ability or inability of  low-income countries 
to fulfill their core obligations, that is, one should 
not only consider their national resources, but also 
resources they receive from international assistance. 
This content downloaded from 157.193.240.1 on Thu, 23 Mar 2017 10:54:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
ooms/hammonds
36 • health and human rights volume 12, no. 1
As Paul Hunt remarked at the May 2000 Committee 
session in which, the general comment on the right 
to health was drafted: 
[I]f  the Committee decided to approve 
the list of  core obligations, it would be 
unfair not to insist also that richer coun-
tries fulfill their obligations relating to 
international cooperation under article 
2, paragraph 1, of  the Covenant. The 
two sets of  obligations should be seen 
as two halves of  a package.51
If  the right to health is meaningless without the real-
ization of  at least its core content, and if  some coun-
tries lack the resources needed to realize the core 
content of  the right to health, then the right to health 
itself  cannot exist without international obligations 
to provide assistance. Without international obliga-
tions to provide assistance — without global respon-
sibility, that is — the right to health is not a right but 
a privilege reserved for those who are born outside 
of  the world’s poorest countries. Such global respon-
sibility does not mean, however, that low-income 
countries have an unconditional and unlimited claim 
to international assistance in order to realize the core 
content of  the right to health. As Philip Alston has 
noted: “The correlative obligation would, of  course, 
be confined to situations in which a developing 
country had demonstrated its best efforts to meet the 
[Millennium Development] Goals and its inability 
to do so because of  a lack of  financial resources.”52 
Thus any claim to international assistance would be a 
conditional one, reserved for countries that demon-
strate their best efforts.
We further suggest that a claim to international assis-
tance would not only be conditional, but also limited. 
Article 2, para. 1 of  the ICESCR — which affirms 
both domestic obligations and international obliga-
tions of  assistance without specifying the difference 
between both — is confusing. If  international obli-
gations of  assistance arise only when domestic obli-
gations have been completely fulfilled, in fact they 
would never arise because the right to health is a mov-
ing goal and the reality is that “the highest attainable 
standard of  physical and mental health” will never be 
completely attained. Under these conditional terms, 
high-income countries could endlessly refute inter-
national obligations of  assistance, referring to their 
domestic obligations. The concept of  core content 
in fact imposes a hierarchy: that it is more urgent to 
realize the minimum essential standard of  health for 
all humans, without which the right to health itself  
becomes meaningless (or a privilege for people born 
in other countries than the poorest ones), than to 
aim for the very highest attainable standard of  health 
domestically. This hierarchy would disappear as soon 
as the minimum essential standard of  health were 
realized everywhere. At that point, in accordance 
with the concept of  core content, rich countries 
could invoke the primacy of  domestic obligations to 
argue a shift from giving international assistance to 
give priority instead to the highest attainable standard 
domestically.
Interpreting the concept of  the core content of  the 
right in this way would also provide for the possibil-
ity of  a sliding scale of  responsibility, one that falls 
between exclusively national responsibility and whol-
ly global responsibility (more on this below). It would 
provide a compass to navigate between that Scylla 
and Charybdis that Daniels identified, that is, between 
the fraught risks of  “cosmopolitan intuition” and 
“strongly statist versions of  relational justice.” While 
we agree to a certain extent with Katharine Young’s 
comment, according to which ‘minimum core’ or 
‘core content’ is a “concept in search of  content,” we 
believe that our use of  it here is consistent with the 
Committee’s general comment on the right to health, 
and that it does give content to the concept even if  it 
fails to answer all of  Young’s concerns.53
taking up daniels’ challenge: toward a 
new paradigm?
In the discussion below, illustrated by Figure 3 and 
Table 1, we outline the new paradigm suggested above 
by drawing on two separate assumptions, in addition 
to the 2001 pledge by African Heads of  State and 
Government to allocate at least 15% of  their budget 
to the health sector.54 First, we assume that, in order 
to realize the core content of  the right to health, gov-
ernments must be able to spend at least the US$40 
per person per year on health-related good identified 
by WHO as necessary for an “adequate package of  
healthcare interventions” (adjusted for inflation).55 
Second, we assume that government revenue, exclud-
ing grants, in low-income countries could reach 20% 
of  GDP.56 If  we then integrate the second of  these 
two assumptions with the Abuja Declaration, we can 
identify a general benchmark that low-income coun-
tries should mobilize. This benchmark would require 
that they raise and allocate the equivalent of  3% 
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of  their GDP to the distribution of  health-related 
goods, in order to satisfy the requirement that they 
are making “best efforts” to realize the core content 
of  the right to health. 
In Table 1, we illustrate how such a sliding scale 
would work. Country A has a GDP per person of  
US$333 and is assumed to be able to spend 3% of  
this amount, or US$10 per person per year, on the 
distribution of  health-related goods. The global 
responsibility towards country A is limited to ensur-
ing that it can achieve health-related goods distribu-
tion worth US$40 per person per year, assuming that 
this financing level is what it takes to realize the core 
content of  the right to health, or the equivalent of  
US$30 per person per year. Country B has a GDP 
per person of  US$1,000, and is able to spend 3% 
of  that amount (or US$30 per person per year) on 
the distribution of  health-related goods. The global 
responsibility towards country B is the equivalent of  
US$10 per person per year. Country C has a GDP per 
person of  US$2,000, and is able to spend 3% of  that 
amount (or US$60 per person per year) on the dis-
tribution of  health-related goods. There is no global 
responsibility towards country C.
Applying such parameters as outlined above, we 
estimate that the cost of  global responsibility for the 
right to health, or the cost of  the obligations of  glob-
al health justice, is about US$50 billion per year. This 
is the amount of  assistance that would be needed by 
59 low-income and lower-middle-income countries, 
representing a population of  2.5 billion. This is illus-
trated by Table 2 on the next page.
The 66 countries or economies presently classified 
as high-income by the World Bank enjoyed a col-
lective GDP of  US$43 trillion in 2008, and US$26 
trillion in 2000. Even when taking into account the 
present global financial crisis, only an extremely pes-
simistic view would maintain that the collective GDP 
of  high-income countries (and economies) will not 
reach US$49 trillion very soon. In other words, to live 
up to their global responsibility, rich countries need 
to allocate only about 0.1% of  their GDP to interna-
tional assistance for health.
In this proposed plan, which we offer in response to 
Daniels’ challenge, international human rights law can 
indeed serve in a very concrete way as a compass toward 
global health justice, enabling us to navigate safely 
Table 1. The “sliding scale” of  national and global responsibility for the realization of  the core 
content of  the right to health in three imaginary countries
Country A
average GDP:









Cost of  core obligations
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Table 2. Costs of  obligations of  global health justice










1 Burundi  120.28  7.64  3.61  36.39  278.07 
2 Congo, Democratic 
Republic of
 148.75  59.28  4.46  35.54  2,106.49 
3 Liberia  170.94  3.58  5.13  34.87  124.81 
4 Guinea-Bissau  192.92  1.65  5.79  34.21  56.31 
5 Ethiopia  202.05  75.07  6.06  33.94  2,547.80 
6 Malawi  239.69  13.12  7.19  32.81  430.52 
7 Sierra Leone  254.29  5.59  7.63  32.37  181.02 
8 Myanmar  256.66  56.51  7.70  32.30  1,825.12 
9 Eritrea  258.13  4.69  7.74  32.26  151.35 
10 Niger  281.80  12.95  8.45  31.55  408.49 
11 Madagascar  287.87  19.16  8.64  31.36  600.90 
12 Afghanistan, Rep. of.  289.31  26.70  8.68  31.32  836.11 
13 Guinea  300.97  9.65  9.03  30.97  298.71 
14 Rwanda  307.88  9.20  9.24  30.76  283.02 
15 Zimbabwe  318.99  11.73  9.57  30.43  357.01 
16 Timor-Leste, Dem. 
Rep. of
 321.93  1.02  9.66  30.34  30.80 
17 Gambia, The  328.29  1.55  9.85  30.15  46.67 
18 Nepal  333.20  27.11  10.00  30.00  813.47 
19 Uganda  333.52  29.85  10.01  29.99  895.45 
20 Central African 
Republic
 352.28  4.19  10.57  29.43  123.20 
21 Togo  352.36  6.30  10.57  29.43  185.43 
22 Mozambique  361.80  19.94  10.85  29.15  581.23 
23 Tanzania  375.68  38.20  11.27  28.73  1,097.47 
24 Bangladesh  418.10  155.96  12.54  27.46  4,282.08 
25 Burkina Faso  430.51  13.42  12.92  27.08  363.42 
between the dual risks of  “cosmopolitan intuition” and 
“strongly statist versions of  relational justice.”
basic institutions for global health 
justice?
Like many philosophers thinking and writing in 
the tradition of  John Rawls, Daniels attaches great 
importance to the existence of  specific identifiable, 
basic institutions as a condition for justice. Here, too, 
his view differs from ours. Relationships between 
people can be unjust even if  not governed by an 
identifiable institution. The identification of  justice 
with specific institutions may suggest a confusion 
between situations of  injustice (which do not require 
identifiable unjust basic institutions) and their rem-
edies (which often do require identifiable corrective 
basic institutions). For example, the Matthew Effect 
described above, which Merton qualified as “an unin-
tended double injustice, in which unknown scientists 
are unjustifiably victimized and famous ones, unjusti-
fiably benefited,” is difficult to attribute to any iden-
tifiable and unjust basic institution.57 And yet, a basic 
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Table 2 (continued). Costs of  obligations of  global health justice










26 Tajikistan  440.58  6.38  13.22  26.78  170.90 
27 Mali  480.07  12.77  14.40  25.60  326.78 
28 Cambodia  512.87  14.16  15.39  24.61  348.61 
29 Kyrgyz Republic  545.93  5.20  16.38  23.62  122.74 
30 Haiti  570.44  8.48  17.11  22.89  194.04 
31 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
 593.57  6.03  17.81  22.19  133.74 
32 Ghana  594.19  21.42  17.83  22.17  475.04 
33 Benin  622.58  7.61  18.68  21.32  162.31 
34 Lesotho  641.50  2.36  19.25  20.76  49.06 
35 Uzbekistan  642.80  26.49  19.28  20.72  548.73 
36 Comoros  645.11  0.63  19.35  20.65  12.92 
37 Kenya  661.40  34.05  19.84  20.16  686.30 
38 Chad  680.86  9.26  20.43  19.57  181.28 
39 Vietnam  724.05  84.16  21.72  18.28  1,538.25 
40 India  759.90  1,152.05  22.80  17.20  19,818.84 
41 Senegal  784.62  11.94  23.54  16.46  196.52 
42 São Tomé and 
Príncipe
 808.41  0.16  24.25  15.75  2.44 
43 Pakistan  820.55  155.37  24.62  15.38  2,390.14 
44 Yemen, Republic of  881.65  21.62  26.45  13.55  292.99 
45 Côte d’Ivoire  888.27  19.57  26.65  13.35  261.30 
46 Nicaragua  890.36  5.91  26.71  13.29  78.57 
47 Zambia  917.42  11.87  27.52  12.48  148.15 
48 Solomon Islands  923.50  0.50  27.70  12.30  6.09 
49 Mauritania  933.42  2.89  28.00  12.00  34.70 
50 Papua New Guinea  947.37  5.92  28.42  11.58  68.51 
51 Moldova  949.46  3.59  28.48  11.52  41.34 
52 Cameroon  979.05  18.34  29.37  10.63  194.94 
53 Sudan  1,005.06  36.22  30.15  9.85  356.69 
54 Djibouti  1,029.54  0.75  30.89  9.11  6.81 
55 Nigeria  1,038.76  140.00  31.16  8.84  1,237.25 
56 Kiribati  1,118.48  0.10  33.55  6.45  0.62 
57 Bolivia  1,197.24  9.63  35.92  4.08  39.31 
58 Guyana  1,200.76  0.76  36.02  3.98  3.02 
59 Mongolia  1,223.77  2.58  36.71  3.29  8.48 
TOTALS  2,452.77  49,042.34 
Source:  Based on data from International Monetary Fund, World economic outlook database (New York: 
International Monetary Fund, October 2009). Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
weo/2009/02/weodata/download.aspx.
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institution might be required to counter its unjust 
effects. Taking his example, a corrective “institution” 
might perhaps take the shape of  a formal and tightly 
enforced system of  agreement between leading aca-
demic journals and/or book publishers to conduct 
strictly anonymous manuscript peer reviews in order 
to prevent publication decisions that might depend 
merely on authors’ reputations. 
While we differ with Daniels’ emphasis on institu-
tions as a condition for justice, he himself  admits 
that others hold much narrower interpretations on 
this point. Building on the views of  Joshua Cohen 
and Charles Sabel, Daniels writes, 
Cohen and Sabel sketch three types 
of  international relationships that 
might give rise to obligations of  jus-
tice beyond humanitarian concerns: 
international agencies for distributing a 
specific good, cooperative schemes, and 
some kinds of  interdependency. Each 
may give rise to obligations of  justice, 
such as concerns about inclusion.58 
Here we would agree with Daniels, if  the global 
free market is understood as a global cooperative 
scheme, and if  some of  its consequences includ-
ing the Matthew Effect are understood as a kind of  
interdependency, thus giving rise to obligations of  
justice. An international agency for the distribution 
of  health-related goods is not necessary for the con-
clusion that the present distribution of  health-related 
goods is unjust. We might, however, need an inter-
national agency for the distribution of  health-related 
goods that would correct the injustice stemming from 
the current global system. Such a global, basic institu-
tion that might rule the distribution of  health-related 
goods in a just manner could take several forms. It 
might take the form Lawrence Gostin proposed, of  
a Framework Convention on Global Health.59 Or 
it might take the form of  a Global Health Fund, as 
we proposed elsewhere.60 In any case, some form of  
conventional entity is necessary in order to enforce 
the interactive and practical applications of  national 
and global responsibility. 
Daniels has noted that “[j]ustice may be one thing 
for people who stand in the relations defined by one 
nation-state and another for those who are mem-
bers of  different nation-states and interact through 
other kinds of  institutions globally.”61 Practically 
speaking, for example, if  Madagascar has a govern-
ment revenue (excluding grants) that equal 11% of  
its GDP, and if  its inhabitants feel that the tax bur-
den is high enough even though their government 
has insufficient resources for a just distribution of  
health-related goods, while Ghana has a govern-
ment revenue (excluding grants) equaling 24% of  its 
GDP, how does one determine the relative roles of  
global responsibility for health?62 Should rich coun-
tries support Madagascar more than Ghana because 
the government of  Madagascar has fewer resources? 
Or should rich countries support Ghana more than 
Madagascar because the inhabitants of  Ghana are 
making a greater effort?
Likewise, what actions would support health justice 
in a situation where, for example, the inhabitants 
of  Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark, support their respective 
governments in allocating the equivalent of  0.7% of  
their GDP or more to international assistance, while 
the governments of  the US and Greece are allocating 
less than the equivalent of  0.2% of  their GDP to 
international assistance?63 Should the inhabitants of  
the more generous rich countries simply accept their 
governments’ practice of  contributing a much higher 
share than that of  certain other rich nations?
These huge differences represent a formidable chal-
lenge inasmuch as they represent differences in 
opinions about global and national responsibility and 
about global and national health justice. However, 
we would argue that these situations should not be 
viewed as an insurmountable challenge; they require 
an agreement between most, if  not all, countries on 
no more than a few parameters.
To summarize here our argument in this paper, we 
have demonstrated that international human rights 
law in general, and the concept of  core content 
of  social human rights in particular, can provide a 
compass to navigate between the global and national 
extremes of  health care justice. We have noted that 
the primary responsibility for realizing the core con-
tent of  the right to health is a national responsibil-
ity. We suggest that States should act on their global 
responsibility, as secondary or subsidiary responsi-
bility for the realization of  the core content of  the 
right to health, as soon as any country exhausts its 
domestic resources and is still unable to realize the 
core content of  the right to health.64 We argue that in 
order to fulfill global responsibilities, rich countries 
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need not allocate more than 0.1% of  their GDP to 
international assistance for health.
Our proposed model is in alignment with the practical 
recommendations of  civil society groups in Europe 
and the US. In Europe, civil society groups with very 
different global health priorities (e.g. access to treat-
ment for HIV, maternal and reproductive health) are 
converging around a common task, that high-income 
countries should allocate at least the equivalent 
of  0.1% of  their GDP to international assistance 
for health.65 In the US, civil society groups are not 
explicitly using the 0.1% of  GDP target, but they are 
demanding that the US contribute US$16 billion to 
international assistance for health, which happens to 
be 0.1% of  the GDP of  the US. 66
An agreement between most, if  not all, countries 
on no more than a few parameters is, we suggest, all 
that is necessary to put this plan in place and create 
a basic institution for global health justice.. Such an 
agreement should include a consensus on how much 
each individual poor countries should contribute (we 
propose 3% of  GDP), an agreement on how much 
they need to realize the core content of  the right to 
health (we propose US$40 per person per year), and 
an agreement on how much rich countries should 
contribute (we propose 0.1% of  GDP). 
To verify the validity of  these parameters, let us exam-
ine the case of  Ethiopia as one example. Applying 
the above figures and the profile for Ethiopia listed 
in Table 1, Ethiopia would need US$2.5 billion per 
year in international assistance for health. The gov-
ernment of  Ethiopia recently estimated the cost of  
its health sector plan at US$1.9 billion per year; with 
a population of  80 million people, this is still less 
than US$25 per person per year. This estimate has 
been validated by the WHO, World Bank, UNFPA, 
UNICEF, and several donor countries including 
Ireland and Spain, in the form of  a “Joint Financial 
Arrangement” according to which Ethiopia would 
need to spend US$1.4 billion per year on health care, 
in addition to the US$0.5 billion it spends on health 
care at present.67 About 80% of  this US$1.9 billion 
per year would need to come from international 
assistance for health. It is obvious that the govern-
ment of  Ethiopia will not be able to replace this high 
level of  international assistance with its own govern-
ment revenue within the coming decades, whether 
one uses the target of  US$2.5 billion target or the 
smaller target of  US$1.5 billion. 
Now let us imagine that Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden together are willing to fill this fiscal gap by 
giving US$1.5 billion per year to Ethiopia for the 
distribution of  health-related goods. Such a decision 
would prompt another global health justice question: 
why would they be willing to do that for Ethiopia 
and not for the other countries needing assistance? In 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, yet another global 
health justice question would be: why should they 
contribute 0.1% of  their GDP to global health while 
other rich countries do not? 
One way to answer such questions would be to 
establish both a convention that details the extent of  
national and global responsibility, and an institution 
that pools and redistributes contributions (or at least 
monitors contributions), and to which all countries 
would be accountable. A Global Fund for Health, 
along the lines of  the existing Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, would provide such 
an institution. 
The Global Fund was created in 2002 “to dramatically 
increase resources to fight three of  the world’s most 
devastating diseases, and to direct those resources to 
areas of  greatest need.”68 It is a global public/private 
partnership that acts as a financial enabler, not as an 
implementer. It pools donor funds and funds pro-
posals based on merit not political considerations.69 
The Global Fund Board issues calls for proposals; 
countries apply for funds through a national-level 
Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) which 
includes representatives from governments, multilat-
eral and bilateral agencies, non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), people living with the diseases, 
academic institutions, and private businesses. The 
proposals are reviewed by the independent Technical 
Review Panel, which makes recommendations to 
the Global Fund Board. The Global Fund Board 
includes representatives of  donor and recipient gov-
ernments, NGOs from the South and the North, the 
private sector and communities affected by the dis-
eases. Once a proposal is approved, a grant is signed 
with a Principal Recipient, proposed by the CCM. A 
Local Fund Agent oversees implementation, acts as 
an independent auditor of  expenditure and activi-
ties, and liaises with the Global Fund’s Secretariat. 
Attempts to formalize donor country burden sharing 
have not yet been successful. 
The Global Fund proposal process does not con-
form to the conventional financial sustainability 
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norm but expands the concept of  financial sustain-
ability beyond national resources to include those of  
the international community.70 This implicit com-
mitment to sustained financing was confirmed in 
the 2006 United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV/AIDS Declaration, in which mem-
ber states committed themselves “to supporting and 
strengthening existing financial mechanisms, includ-
ing the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria, as well as relevant United Nations organiza-
tions, through the provision of  funds in a sustained 
manner.”71
A Global Fund for Health — along the lines of  the 
existing Global Fund but with a wider health-related 
goods mandate — would allow for the monitoring 
of  contributions from all high-income countries in 
accordance with an agreed burden-sharing key (0.1% 
of  GDP, for example). Such a model would also 
ensure that all countries in need of  assistance would 
receive it in accordance with their needs, after verify-
ing that they are making their “best efforts.” 
conclusion
In taking up Daniels’ challenge in this paper, we 
have formulated what we believe is a substantiated 
response that has real potential for practical appli-
cation. Like Daniels, we believe that obligations of  
global health justice do exist, that there is a global 
responsibility for growing inter-country inequalities 
in wealth that has a direct impact on global inequali-
ties in the distribution of  health-related goods, and 
that it is possible to imagine ways of  correcting the 
distribution of  health-related goods “in between 
state-mediated justice and the cosmopolitan view.”72 
Our view differs from Daniels in the strength of  our 
assertion that international human rights law can pro-
vide a compass to guide us on the forward path of  
defining and negotiating between national and global 
responsibility for health, by using the concept of  core 
content of  the right to health. We also differ from 
Daniels by outlining a very explicit proposal for put-
ting this compass to work, described above.
If  obligations of  global health justice have not been 
taken seriously until recently, it is perhaps due to a 
naïve belief  that promoting health justice within the 
borders of  countries (through health development) 
in combination with some exceptional efforts for 
exceptional crises (through medical relief) is suf-
ficient. We suggest that the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
has made it manifestly clear that this is not the case. 
The global AIDS response required a new paradigm, 
which in our view was the first real attempt at achiev-
ing global health justice.
Yet this model lacked a strong theoretical basis and, 
as a result, the opportunities for building on its suc-
cess are now at risk, in a climate of  economic caution. 
This is evident in the increasing number of  voices 
arguing that the “exceptionality” of  the global AIDS 
response is in itself  a global health injustice.73 We 
would agree with this argument, but we reject the solu-
tion that is often proposed in the attempt to correct 
the “exceptionality,” namely the solution to redirect 
part of  the funding of  the global AIDS response to 
the distribution of  other health-related goods. In our 
opinion, this proposed solution results from an insuf-
ficient understanding of  the aim of  self-sufficiency, a 
concept abandoned (perhaps too exuberantly) in the 
global AIDS response. To adopt it retrospectively for 
the global AIDS response would only result in less 
funding for the global AIDS response, not in more 
funding for the distribution of  other health-related 
goods. If, instead, the solution were to expand the 
new approach to sustainability, based on obligations 
of  global health justice, the result would not require 
reducing global AIDS funding; it would require abso-
lute increases in funding for health, both national and 
international. Considering the millions of  premature 
human deaths that such a move could prevent every 
year, if  only obligations of  global health justice were 
taken seriously, we believe that it is time to end such 
funding ambiguities. Every human death that could 
have been avoided at a daily cost less than the price 
of  a cup of  coffee in rich countries is an example 
of  the continuing human tragedy of  global health 
injustice.
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